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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bross

SUBJECT : Analysis of Aerodynamic Force Needs (Nitze Study)

REFERENCE : A. Memo for Secretary of the Air Force, et al, from Paul H. Nitze, dtd. 14 August 1968, Subj: Reconnaissance Program.

B. An Analysis of Aerodynamic Reconnaissance Force Needs, dtd. 20 November 1968.

1. Attached is the draft committee report for comment by the addressees in Reference A. (the memo from Mr. Nitze setting up the study).

2. There are two primary issues in this paper which I feel are of significance to the DCI.

a. The consequences of the U-2 program handling (p. 2).

b. The consequences of the methodology used to arrive to 147T and 154 drone force needs.

3. The U-2 Issue

The study makes no recommendation for the U-2 forces for the North Vietnam, South China, North Korea or the Middle East contingency "because of a combination of political and vulnerability factors."

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The point is that the committee considered the U2R too vulnerable for cost/effective operations in these areas. The "Project ☐ study also found the U2R to be of relatively high vulnerability in the South China area.

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I am sending a copy of the study to ☐ for their information and any comments they may care to make to you.

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5. This entire issue is of inimportance to the DCI because neither the operator (USAF) or ASD/SA are explicitly considering the system factors essential to intelligence purposes. USAF is using the attrition figures to prove that both vehicles are essential. ASD/SA is using operating scenarios and failing to place any value on the difference in sensor characteristics or uncertainties in probable attrition calculations.

6. All of this assumes that the intelligence requirements stated by DIA in the study are sacred and without alternatives or options.

7. From an intelligence objectives standpoint, the choice between the USAF and ASD/SA position is clear. US Intelligence will lose an advantage in future flexibility (1971-72 time period) against South China as well as other China contingencies if the 154 program is halted.

The disadvantage in the USAF position continues to be the procurement rate of the older and less capable 147 series vehicles.

8. If the DCI desires to comment to the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the ASD/A on this study, I suggest that we prepare a memo including [] views.

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A/D/DCI/NIFE

Attachment:

References A. and B.

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